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Protecting the Mickey Mouse Ears: 
Moving Beyond Traditional Campaign-
Style Enforcement of Intellectual 
Property Rights in China 
Adela Hurtado* 
Multinational corporations often struggle to protect their 
intellectual property rights in China. The Walt Disney Company, 
which has a long relationship with China, knows this all too well. 
In fact, counterfeit Mickey Mouse ears—along with numerous 
other Disney character goods—are now sold in plain sight at the 
new Shanghai Disneyland Resort. In an attempt to combat 
counterfeiting, companies such as Disney rely on a traditional 
method of enforcement of intellectual property rights: government 
campaigns. Campaigns are short periods of time during which 
multiple raids and government enforcement actions occur to crack 
down on counterfeiting. The irony of Disney’s situation is that less 
than a year before the Shanghai Disneyland Resort opened Disney 
was part of a high-profile campaign to protect its trademarks and 
prevent counterfeiting at the new park. However, the results of the 
Disney campaign are not surprising. Campaigns as practiced are 
generally ineffective, with counterfeit goods manufacturers and 
                                                                                                             
*  J.D., Fordham University School of Law, 2017; B.A., Politics & East Asian Studies, 
New York University, 2014; photographer, filmmaker, and writer. I would like to thank 
my family and friends for their enduring support throughout the writing process. I would 
also like to thank my professor Mark Cohen, along with Professor Eric Priest, Attorney-
Advisor at the U.S. Patent and Trademark Office, Conrad Wong, National Program 
Manager at the National Intellectual Property Rights Center, Man Fung Tse, the 20th 
U.S.-China IP Cooperation Dialogue participants, and my Fordham Law China IP Law 
Spring 2017 classmates for their feedback and enthusiasm for this Note. In addition, I am 
grateful for the experts who frequently assisted me with understanding Chinese 
enforcement mechanisms. Finally, I would like to thank the editors of the Fordham 
Intellectual Property, Media & Entertainment Law Journal, and Senior Writing & 
Research Editor Jillian Roffer, for their help in publishing this Note. 
422       FORDHAM INTELL. PROP. MEDIA & ENT. L.J. [Vol. XXVIII:421 
 
sellers returning to their businesses within days. Herein lies the 
issue: While campaigns are marked with a high volume of 
enforcement, in the long-term they are ineffective for combating 
intellectual property rights infringement. This Note uses Disney as 
a case study to illustrate the present usage of campaigns as an 
attempt to alleviate the infringement, despite their long-term 
ineffectiveness. Though rarely used, there are new opportunities 
for multinational corporations to incorporate civil litigation into 
their anti-counterfeiting strategy as a means to move away from 
depending heavily on campaigns and provide long-term change. 
Additionally, a comparison to the United States version of a 
campaign provides a new model for multinational corporations 
which can be used to push for more effective practices that not 
only benefit them, but also China. It is time for a new strategy to 
combat infringement. By changing course, multinational 
corporations and the government can strengthen intellectual 
property rights in China. 
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INTRODUCTION 
Waiting on line for a Shanghai Disneyland ride can entail some 
on-the-go shopping.1 A salesman will sneak through the lines and 
approach those innocently waiting to offer a pair of Mickey Mouse 
ears. 2  The seller will have them stashed in a black bag, with 
headgear ranging from plain Mickey Mouse ears to his 
counterpart’s Minnie Mouse ears that come with bows in a variety 
of colors.3 The ears will fetch a bargain price of 20 Renminbi 
(“RMB”), equivalent to 3.11 USD, compared to the officially 
licensed ears sold throughout the park ranging from 75 RMB 
(roughly 12 USD) to 180 RMB (roughly 28 USD).4 
The blatant disregard for intellectual property rights at the heart 
of the park is a symptom of a larger problem plaguing The Walt 
Disney Company (“Disney”) and other multinational companies 
when conducting business in China. Globally, levels of intellectual 
property infringement have significantly risen. 5  Most infringing 
goods seized by U.S., European Union, and Japanese customs 
authorities originate from East Asia, with China as the top 
producer—accounting for over seventy percent of counterfeit 
goods production and eighty-six percent when combined with 
Hong Kong.6 Companies from each market segment and industry 
                                                                                                             
1 Based on author’s observations and personal experiences during three trips to the 
park in October, November, and December 2016. Specific instances are described in 
Section II.B.1 [hereinafter Author’s Experiences]. 
2 The term “salesman” is used loosely here as this person is not an actual salesman, 
but rather someone in plainclothes attempting to sell the Mickey ears. 
3 Author’s Experiences, supra note 1. 
4 The RMB is the Chinese national currency. See Matt Phillips, Yuan or Renminbi: 
What’s the Right Word for China’s Currency?, WALL STREET J. (June 21, 2010), 
https://blogs.wsj.com/marketbeat/2010/06/21/yuan-or-renminbi-whats-the-right-word-
for-chinas-currency/ [https://perma.cc/2YZ7-NNN2]. For examples of headbands 
currently on sale see, Search Results for “Headband”, on Disney Search, DISNEY, 
https://search.disney.com/search?o=store&q=headband [https://perma.cc/9J9L-4Z7X] 
(last visited Nov. 24, 2017) (search in search bar for “Headband;” then select the “Store” 
hyperlink to limit the search results). There are no websites with prices of headbands sold 
in the parks. 
5 See GLOB. INTELLECTUAL PROP. CTR., U.S. CHAMBER OF COMMERCE, MEASURING 
THE MAGNITUDE OF GLOBAL COUNTERFEITING 5, 7 (2016), http://www.theglobalipcenter
.com/wp-content/themes/gipc/map-index/assets/pdf/2016/GlobalCounterfeiting_Report
.pdf [https://perma.cc/CP3X-ZS89]. 
6 See id. at 16, 19. 
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experience billions of dollars in losses along with damage to their 
brands’ reputation as a result of counterfeit production.7 The total 
global economic value of counterfeit and pirated goods is as much 
as 1.13 trillion dollars.8 The already billions of dollars in losses are 
anticipated  to  multiply  significantly  in  the  years  to  come.9 
However, companies that do business with and within China need 
a way to cope with this reality. To cope, these companies primarily 
rely on government agency campaigns, especially the raids  
they include.10 
Part I of this Note highlights the heavy reliance on campaigns 
in China to enforce intellectual property rights, and uses Disney’s 
recent campaign in China as an example of a company with a long 
history in China that depends on the campaign approach. Part II 
details the short-term advantages and long-term ineffectiveness of 
the campaign approach, foreign companies’ rare use of civil 
litigation to enforce their rights, and obstacles to effectively using 
criminal prosecution. Part III argues that foreign companies should 
stop relying on campaigns to enforce their rights and take 
advantage of ample new opportunities in civil litigation. Part III 
additionally proposes a model, using examples from campaigns 
and corporate alliances in the United States, for a new type of 
Chinese campaign approach. In sum, this Note aims to provide 
alternative strategies for multinational corporations to move away 
from solely using a traditional method of enforcement that will 
never fully accomplish their goals to eradicate—or at least 
reduce—infringement of their intellectual property rights in China. 
                                                                                                             
7 Id. at 10; see also NATHAN WAJSMAN ET AL., OFFICE FOR HARMONIZATION IN THE 
INTERNAL MKT., THE ECONOMIC COST OF IPR INFRINGEMENT IN THE CLOTHING, 
FOOTWEAR AND ACCESSORIES SECTOR 14 (2015), https://euipo.europa.eu/tunnel-web/
secure/webdav/guest/document_library/observatory/resources/research-and-studies/ip_
infringement/study2/the_economic_cost_of_IPR_infringement_in_the_clothing_
footwear_and_accessories_sector_en.pdf [https://perma.cc/T5FG-CC2U]. For example, 
the clothing, footwear, and accessories sector loses 26.3 billion euros of revenue 
annually. See WAJSMAN ET AL., supra. 
8 Andrew Baker, Toll of Counterfeiting and Piracy Predicted to Top $2.3 Trillion as 
Call Made for Governments to Do More, DATADOT TECH. LTD. (Feb. 22, 2017), 
http://www.ddotdna.eu/toll-of-counterfeiting-and-piracy-predicted-to-top-2-3-trillion-as-
call-made-for-governments-to-do-more/ [https://perma.cc/Y9X4-NGBT]. Millions of 
jobs are lost due to counterfeiting as well. See id. 
9 See id. 
10 See generally Part II. 
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I. THE CHINESE CAMPAIGN AND DISNEY’S LONG STRUGGLE TO 
COPE WITH INFRINGEMENT IN CHINA 
Knowing who is charged with enforcing intellectual property 
rights and where they stand in the context of the Chinese 
government is important when exploring how multinational 
corporations enforce their rights in China. First, Section I.A 
provides an overview of and defines the powers of the Chinese 
government and its intellectual property agencies. Section I.B 
explains the campaign approach the government uses to combat 
infringement in China. Section I.C then details the history of 
Disney in China. Finally, Section I.D discusses the special 
government campaign executed to protect Disney’s intellectual 
property rights. 
A. The Chinese Government Structure and Its Agencies 
The Chinese government structure has several government 
bodies that generally operate under the Chinese Communist 
Party.11 According to China’s Constitution, the National People’s 
Congress (“NPC”) is China’s legislative body.12 Among its roles, 
the NPC elects the President and Vice President of the People’s 
Republic  of  China.13  The  NPC  also  introduces  and  drafts  
legislation.14 The judicial system’s highest bodies are The Supreme 
People’s Court and The Supreme People’s Procuratorate.15  The 
Supreme People’s Court supervises lower courts.16 The Supreme 
People’s Procuratorate is charged with supervising regional and 
special procuratorates, and investigating and prosecuting cases.17 
The most relevant governing body for this Note is the State 
Council, which carries out the Chinese government’s laws and 
administrative  functions.18  It  is  composed  of  ministries  and  
                                                                                                             
11 See XIANFA pmbl. (2004) (China). 
12 See id. art. 2. 
13 See id. art. 62, § 4. 
14 See id. art. 62, §§ 1–3. 
15 See id. arts. 127, 132; see also People’s Procuratorates, CHINA.ORG.CN, 
http://www.china.org.cn/english/features/Brief/192298.htm [https://perma.cc/FS2H-
4C3N] (last visited Dec. 17, 2017) (detailing a procuratorate’s judicial functions). 
16 See XIANFA art. 127. 
17 See id. art. 133; People’s Procuratorates, supra note 15. 
18 See XIANFA arts. 85, 91. 
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commissions and is led by the Premier, Vice Premiers, State 
Councilors, Ministers, Auditor-General, and the Secretary 
General,19 who are decided by the National People’s Congress.20  
The State Council can adopt administrative measures, enact 
administrative regulations, formulate tasks and responsibilities for 
lower bodies, create national economic plans, and exercise other 
powers.21  Its  lower  bodies  include  key  intellectual  property 
enforcement agencies—such as the State Administration for 
Industry and Commerce (“SAIC”); General Administration of 
Customs; National Copyright Administration; and the State 
Intellectual Property Office (“SIPO”), China’s patent office.22 
The SAIC is in charge of market supervision and regulation in 
China.23 As part of its mission, the SAIC strives to protect the 
“legitimate rights and interests of businesses and consumers by 
carrying out regulations in the fields of enterprise registration, 
competition, consumer protection, trademark protection and 
combating economic illegalities.”24 To carry out this mission, the 
SAIC consists of over ten departments and bureaus that focus on 
specific issues.25  For example, the overwhelming majority—over 
seventy-eight percent—of the SAIC’s cases involve products sold 
that  infringe  on  registered  trademarks.26  One  bureau,  the 
                                                                                                             
19 See id. arts. 85–86. Ministries and commissions include the Ministry of Commerce 
and the National Development and Reform Commission. See China’s State 
Organizational Structure, CONG.-EXEC. COMM’N ON CHINA, https://www.cecc.gov/
chinas-state-organizational-structure [https://perma.cc/5CKD-SKPE] (last visited  
Nov. 24, 2017). 
20 See XIANFA art. 62, § 5. 
21 See id. art. 89 (defining these and other powers such as directing urban and rural 
development, education, family planning, public security, foreign affairs, etc.). 
22 See China’s State Organizational Structure, supra note 19. 
23 See Mission, ST. ADMIN. FOR INDUS. & COMMERCE OF CHINA, http://www.saic.gov.cn
/english/aboutus/Mission/ [https://perma.cc/6PXY-323D] (last visited Nov. 25, 2017). 
24 Id. 
25 See Departments, ST. ADMIN. FOR INDUS. & COM. OF CHINA, http://www.saic.gov.cn/
english/aboutus/Departments/ [https://perma.cc/ZLS4-4BP2] (last visited Nov. 24, 2017). 
26 TRADEMARK OFFICE/TRADEMARK REVIEW & ADJUDICATION BD. OF STATE ADMIN. 
FOR INDUS. & COMMERCE, CHINA, ANNUAL DEVELOPMENT REPORT ON CHINA’S 
TRADEMARK STRATEGY 2014, at 15 (2015), http://sbj.saic.gov.cn/sbtj/201505/
P020161012051169314721.pdf [https://perma.cc/VEW2-CGVX]. 
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Trademark Office, is in charge of these cases, along with 
trademark registrations, and trademark disputes.27 
B. Campaign-Style Enforcement in China 
It is impossible to discuss intellectual property rights 
enforcement in China without focusing on campaigns, or 
zhuanxiang xingdong, which roughly translates to “special 
campaigns.”28  Campaigns, primarily used against copyright and 
trademark infringement, are short periods of time during which an 
agency or several agencies perform a series of quick raids and 
enforcement  actions  against  infringers.29  The  campaign  lasts 
between one and two weeks, with a decision issued within a couple 
of months.30 Campaigns are the most common type of intellectual 
property rights enforcement action in China and usually the first 
response  to  counterfeiting  issues.31  The  SAIC  and  its  local 
counterparts have the administrative power to conduct campaigns 
on behalf of trademark holders.32 This agency, or another such as 
                                                                                                             
27 See Departments, supra note 25. 
28 The Chinese characters for “special campaign” are “专项行动.” As an example, this 
term is used in the State Council’s 2013 regulatory document, Notice of the General 
Office of the State Council on Issuing the 2013 Major Tasks for the Nationwide 
Crackdown on IPR Infringements and on the Production and Sale of Counterfeit and 
Shoddy Commodities, (Gen. Office of the State Council effective May 7, 2013), 
CLI.2.201618 (EN) (PKULAW.CN), http://en.pkulaw.cn/display.aspx?cgid=201618
&lib=law [https://perma.cc/F2HS-79M8] (last visited Nov. 25, 2017). 
29 MARTIN K. DIMITROV, PIRACY AND THE STATE: THE POLITICS OF INTELLECTUAL 
PROPERTY RIGHTS IN CHINA 14–15 (2009); see also Xuefang Huang & Michael Lin, Anti-
Counterfeiting Options in China, MARKS & CLERK (Aug. 13, 2014), https://www.marks-
clerk.com/Home/Knowledge-News/Articles/Anti-counterfeiting-options-in-
China.aspx#.WeJMKmW5659 [https://perma.cc/T525-ZJKK]. 
30 Huang & Lin, supra note 29. 
31 See BOB YOUILL, FTI CONSULTING & PRACTICAL LAW CHINA, EFFECTIVE ANTI-
COUNTERFEITING ENFORCEMENT IN CHINA: STAGE BY STAGE 7 (2014), 
http://www.fticonsulting-asia.com/~/media/Files/us-files/insights/reports/effective-anti-
counterfeiting-enforcement-china.pdf [https://perma.cc/Y26Q-UYJE]; see also 
DIMITROV, supra note 29, at 187 (discussing campaigns). 
32 See Huang & Lin, supra note 29. Other agencies can also join the SAIC in a 
campaign so responsibilities can be shared among them. See DIMITROV, supra note 29, at 
187. The SAIC’s local counterparts are local bodies that carry out the SAIC’s operations 
on the provincial, county, and municipal levels. See Trademark Registration in China, 
PATH TO CHINA (last updated Jan. 3, 2018), http://www.pathtochina.com/reg_tm.htm 
[https://perma.cc/R8CJ-HK25]. 
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SIPO, creates an “Action Plan” or “Implementation Plan” which 
authorizes and coordinates intellectual property campaigns.33 
Raids, a key component of campaigns, involve the SAIC and 
law enforcement authorities sweeping through a market that sells 
counterfeit goods or a factory that produces them.34 During the 
raid, the authorities confiscate the counterfeit goods and arrest 
workers and sellers.35 Once rights holders are notified about the 
counterfeit goods, they begin a raid by petitioning the SAIC with 
documentation on the trademark and on the infringer.36 After the 
SAIC processes the documentation, it will conduct the raid with 
the help of law enforcement within one to two weeks of the 
petition if it decides to do so.37 Once the raid is completed, if the 
SAIC finds that infringement did in fact occur, it can “order[] the 
infringer to cease the infringing conduct, confiscat[e] or destr[oy 
the] counterfeit goods, [or] impos[e] fines” on the infringers.38 The 
SAIC does not have the power to give monetary compensation to 
the rights holders, as that is in the courts’ jurisdiction.39 
The Disney campaign this Note focuses on in Section I.D 
embodies much of the typical Chinese campaign.40 The Disney 
                                                                                                             
33 JIANFU CHEN, CHINESE LAW: CONTEXT AND TRANSFORMATION: REVISED AND 
EXPANDED EDITION 803–04 (3d ed. 2015). 
34 See Section II.B; see also, e.g., Shen Lu & Charles Riley, Police Raid Chinese 
Factory that Was Churning Out Fake iPhones, CNNTECH (July 28, 2015, 6:23 AM), 
http://money.cnn.com/2015/07/28/technology/china-fake-iphone-factory/index.html 
[https://perma.cc/9GWK-E55B]. 
35 See, e.g., Lu & Riley, supra note 34. 
36 See Huang & Lin, supra note 29. The owner of the intellectual property needs to 
show proof of ownership of their rights and any materials they have on the infringement, 
which can include trademark registration certificates and samples of infringing products. 
See id. 
37 See id. 
38 See IPKEY, ROADMAP FOR INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY PROTECTION IN CHINA 15 (2015), 
www.ipkey.org/en/ip-law-document/download/3356/3805/23 [https://perma.cc/2YS4-
MW7G]. Fines imposed can be up to five hundred percent of the profits gained from the 
counterfeit goods or up to the limit of 250,000 RMB (38,000 USD). CHEN, supra note 33, 
at 806 (alterations in original). 
39 IPKEY, supra note 38, at 13. 
40 Affirming the similarities between campaigns, Simone Intellectual Property Services 
firm (“SIPS”), a leading Hong Kong law firm serving multinational corporations in 
China, stated that the Disney campaign was similar to initiatives of other short-term 
campaigns occurring from time to time, such as the 2008 Olympic Games anti-
counterfeiting campaign. See Special Campaign on Protection of Disney Trademarks, 
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campaign consisted of the SAIC announcing the campaign’s start 
and  subsequent  enforcement  efforts.41  The  campaign  was  also 
relatively long, lasting nearly a year.42 
C. Disney’s Life in China 
The Walt Disney Company was founded in 1923 and is based 
in  the  United  States.43  It  is  primarily  in  the  filmmaking  and 
television businesses, but also builds its own theme parks around 
the world and licenses its logos, films, and characters.44 Disney’s 
repertoire includes its large intellectual property portfolio of over 
five thousand trademarks and over one thousand patents—one of 
their trademarks being Mickey Mouse and his ears, registered in a 
variety of forms to ensure the character’s protection. 45  Disney 
generates billions of dollars in revenue annually through 
merchandising, licensing, and selling consumer products of its 
intellectual property.46 As of 2016, its numerous ventures created a 
                                                                                                             
SIPS, http://sips.asia/knowledge/legislation-and-policy/special-campaign-on-protection-
of-disney-trademarks/ [https://perma.cc/P8ZV-QNF4] (last visited Nov. 25, 2017). 
41 See id. 
42 Compare id. (calling the Disney campaign an “unusual year-long campaign”), with 
Huang & Lin, supra note 29 (stating that the average raid occurs within one to two 
weeks, with decisions issued within a couple of  months). 
43 See About the Walt Disney Company, WALT DISNEY COMPANY, 
https://thewaltdisneycompany.com/about/ [https://perma.cc/KHC6-AYHS] (last visited. 
Dec. 22, 2017); Profile: Walt Disney Co (DIS.N), REUTERS, https://www.reuters.com/
finance/stocks/company-profile/DIS.N [https://perma.cc/89M4-VQKL] (last visited Dec. 
21, 2017) (showing company is based in Burbank, California). 
44 See Tom Delaney & Tami Stawicki, UNIV. CONN., THE WALT DISNEY COMPANY 
(NYSE:DIS) (2016), http://smf.business.uconn.edu/wp-content/uploads/sites/818/2016/
12/DIS-Report.pdf [https://perma.cc/R3N4-P3QP]. 
45 See Disney Profile, JUSTIA, http://companyprofiles.justia.com/company/disney 
[https://perma.cc/N7A4-V2Q3] (last visited Nov. 24, 2017); see also Jackson Gerber, 
Note, Mickey Mouse in the Year 2023: What Happens Now?, TOURO L. REV. ONLINE 
EDITION (Apr. 15, 2013), http://www.tourolawreview.com/2013/04/mickey-mouse-in-the
-year-2023-what-happens-now/ [https://perma.cc/6NWC-RTBE]. Examples of its 
trademarks and uses associated with the Mickey Mouse ears are found in the Notice of 
Opposition filed at the U.S. Patent and Trademark Office against Deadmau5 in 2014. See 
generally Notice of Opposition, Disney Enterprises, Inc., No. 6182.6914 (T.T.A.B.  
Sept. 2, 2014) (notice of opposition)http://www.trademarkologist.com/files/2014/09/
Disney-Notice-of-Opposition.pdf [https://perma.cc/AJ69-B5PJ]. 
46 Walt Disney Co., Annual Report Pursuant to Section 13 or 15(d) of the Securities 
Act of 1934 (Form 10-K) (Oct. 3, 2015), at 24, 65, https://www.sec.gov/Archives/edgar/
data/1001039/000100103915000255/fy2015_q4x10k.htm [https://perma.cc/8ABC-
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top brand valued at 39.5 billion USD.47 Therefore, the issue of 
counterfeiting in China is particularly important to the company, as 
it has invested an enormous amount of time, resources, and capital 
into expanding its business in the country.48 
Disney’s relationship with China began on unfriendly terms 
when the Mickey Mouse character and all Disney films were 
banned in 1949 as part of a larger ban on foreign films when the 
Communist  Party  rose  to  power.49  In  1986,  Disney  was 
“rehabilitated,” and the company in that year signed a licensing 
agreement  to  supply  cartoons  for  China’s  national  network.50 
Disney then resumed its operations in China, only to have its films 
banned again in the 1996 when the company released Martin 
Scorsese’s “Kundun,” a film on the Dalai Lama’s life, through its 
subsidiary Touchstone Pictures.51 The ban continued until 1999, 
when the government allowed the release of Disney’s “Mulan” in 
exchange for agreements to hire Jackie Chan as a voice actor for 
                                                                                                             
HTHX]; Marc Graser, Disney Brands Generate Record $40.9 Billion from Licensed 
Merchandise in 2013, VARIETY (June 17, 2014), http://variety.com/2014/biz/news/
disney-brands-generate-record-40-9-billion-from-licensed-merchandise-in-2013-
1201221813/ [https://perma.cc/JW8D-D5YS]; Natalie Robehmed, The ‘Frozen’ Effect: 




47 See The World’s Most Valuable Brands, FORBES (2016), https://www.forbes.com/
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XINHUANET (July 13, 2017, 7:41 PM), http://news.xinhuanet.com/english/2017-07/13/c
_136441501.htm [https://perma.cc/6HEQ-G7U4]. 
49 See ASIAN POPULAR CULTURE: THE GLOBAL (DIS)CONTINUITY 59 (Anthony Y.H. 
Fung ed., 1st ed. 2013); TAN YE & YUN ZHU, HISTORICAL DICTIONARY OF CHINESE 
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.htm [https://perma.cc/PYX7-UPVA]. 
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51 Daniel Frankel, ‘Mulan’ Freed for Release in China, E! NEWS (Feb. 8, 1999), 
http://www.eonline.com/news/37704/mulan-freed-for-release-in-china 
[https://perma.cc/V94G-HSRG]; Bernard Weinraub, Disney Will Defy China on Its Dalai 
Lama Film, N.Y. TIMES (Nov. 27, 1996), http://www.nytimes.com/1996/11/27/movies
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the Mandarin version of the film and to distribute two Chinese 
films in the United States.52 
Despite its precarious status in the country, Disney persisted 
with its relationship with China.53 Disney first broke ground with 
the opening of Hong Kong Disneyland in 2005.54 While not on the 
mainland, the Hong Kong theme park marked what Bob Iger, 
President of The Walt Disney Company, stated was the “first big 
step” to expand the company’s reach into China.55 Disney then 
increased its efforts. Most notably, after ten years of planning and 
five years of construction, Disney opened Shanghai Disneyland 
Resort in June 2016 in partnership with state-owned Shanghai 
Shendi Group.56 The park cost five-and-a-half billion dollars and 
covers 963 acres, making the park three times larger than its Hong 
Kong counterpart.57 The Shanghai Disneyland Resort also has the 
tallest Disney castle ever built in all its parks.58 The park soon 
became a hit with over eleven million visitors in its first year.59 
However, regardless of its status in the People’s Republic of 
China, Disney continues to suffer from widespread intellectual 
                                                                                                             
52 See Erik Eckholm, Easing Tensions, Disney Gains O.K. to Show ‘Mulan’ in China, 
N.Y. TIMES (Feb. 8, 1999), http://www.nytimes.com/1999/02/08/world/easing-tensions-
disney-gains-ok-to-show-mulan-in-china.html [https://perma.cc/C9NR-V753]; Frankel, 
supra note 51. 
53 For more examples of Disney bans see, Alyssa Abkowitz & Eva Dou, Alibaba-
Disney Partnership Is Frozen in China, WALL STREET J. (Apr. 26, 2016), 
https://www.wsj.com/articles/alibaba-disney-partnership-frozen-in-china-1461645337; 
Joe McDonald, China Bans ‘Simpsons’ from Prime-Time TV, WASH. POST (Aug. 13, 
2006), http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/2006/08/13/
AR2006081300242.html [https://perma.cc/SW6W-2P38]. 
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TIME (June 16, 2016), http://time.com/4371493/shanghai-disneyland-park/ 
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opening-htmlstory.html [https://perma.cc/LRN8-W5PA]. 
57 Gaudiosi, supra note 56. 
58 Id. 
59 See Eunice Yoon, Shanghai Disneyland Visitors Top [Eleven] Million in Its First 
Year, Blowing Past Expectations, CEO Iger Says, CNBC (June 16, 2017), 
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property infringement through online and physical markets, as 
counterfeiters flood China with pirated Disney products.60 
D. Disney Turns to the Campaign Approach 
The irony of recent infringement under Disney’s “nose” is 
highlighted by Disney’s path to eliminate this infringement. While 
the current infringement situation in China is challenging, Disney 
continued to cultivate its relationship with China and developed a 
coping strategy.61 So far, the company’s primary strategy appears 
to be to “keep a close relationship with local government officials 
and to cry out loudly and often to get their ear.”62 Disney’s strategy 
led to the SAIC launching a year-long campaign (the “Disney 
Campaign”) to “crack down” specifically on Disney trademarks.63 
The SAIC called this campaign a “special action” to protect Disney 
in anticipation of Shanghai Disneyland Resort’s grand opening in 
June 2016, perhaps due to Disney’s joint venture with the 
Shanghai government firm.64 In addition to protecting the Disney 
brand, the SAIC declared that this campaign also sought to protect 
                                                                                                             
60 See, e.g., Angela Doland, In China, There’s Not Just Disney, There’s ‘Dlsnay’ and 
‘Disnesy’ Too, AD AGE (June 2, 2016), http://adage.com/article/cmo-strategy/china-
disney-disnesy/304220/ [https://perma.cc/U3RT-ND3B]; Alice Hines, Fake Apple, 
Disney and Ikea Stores: The Ultimate Knockoffs?, AOL FIN. (Aug. 10, 2011, 11:00 AM), 
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the-u-s-obsessio/20013610/ [https://perma.cc/2HPM-8V6J]; Special Campaign on 
Protection of Disney Trademarks, supra note 40. Section II.B.1 also has examples of 
Disney counterfeit goods in China. 
61 See Adam Jourdan, China Says Disney to Get Special Trademark Protection, 
REUTERS (Nov. 5, 2015), http://uk.reuters.com/article/us-walt-disney-china-
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[https://perma.cc/5VYZ-JFJ3]. 
63 For the original notice by the SAIC in Mandarin see, Gongshang Zongju Guanyu 
Kaizhan Baohu “Dishini” Zhuce Shangbiao Zhuanyongquan Zhuanxiang Xingdong de 
Tongzhi (工商总局关于开展保护 “迪士尼”注册商标专用权专项行动的通知), 
Notice of the State Administration for Industry and Commerce on the Special Action to 
Protect the Exclusive Right of the Registered Trademark of Disney, SAIC (Nov. 5, 2015), 
http://www.saic.gov.cn/zw/zcfg/gzjwj/201511/t20151105_216928.html 
[https://perma.cc/V8NV-NR2X]; see also Neil Gough, China Moves to Crack Down on 
Counterfeit Disney Products, N.Y. TIMES (Nov. 5, 2015), https://www.nytimes.com/2015
/11/06/business/media/disney-china-trademark.html [https://perma.cc/K6HF-J3JW]. 
64 See Gough, supra note 63. 
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the future development of the Shanghai Disneyland Resort and to 
“uphold China’s international image for safeguarding intellectual  
property rights.”65 
The Disney Campaign entailed numerous actions to crack 
down on Disney counterfeits. The SAIC declared it would 
establish a “key protected area” around the Shanghai Disneyland 
Resort  and  strengthen  patrols  in  this  area.66  The  enforcement 
efforts in this protected area were to be significantly increased to 
“comprehensively  eliminate”  infringement.67  The  SAIC  then 
created “emergency teams” (similar to teams that carry out raids) 
to watch for counterfeits, whether on sale online or elsewhere, and 
to coordinate efforts among national and local officials. 68  The 
SAIC charged local SAIC divisions and authorities with inspecting 
wholesale distributions, production factories, and where 
trademarks are printed.69 The SAIC also called for local agencies 
to  carry  out  “collective  rectification”  against  local  infringers.70 
Additionally, the SAIC encouraged authorities nationwide to 
strengthen enforcement and narrow opportunities for people to 
infringe Disney’s trademarks.71 Edward Chatterton, a Hong Kong 
intellectual property lawyer, commented at the time, “I don’t think 
I’ve seen a specific brand being protected in this sort of 
comprehensive way before.”72 These moves, focusing solely on 
Disney products and its trademarks, were unprecedented.73 
Results soon came in. Within two months, officials seized a 
large batch of counterfeit Disney children’s clothing in 
                                                                                                             
65 Special Campaign on Protection of Disney Trademarks, supra note 40. 
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http://www.globaltimes.cn/content/952354.shtml [https://perma.cc/MV36-ZRBD]. 
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69 See Jie, supra note 62; Special Campaign on Protection of Disney Trademarks, 
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71 See id. 
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73 See Rhonda Tin, Trademark Protection in China – If Everyone Could Be Disney, 
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Hangzhou,74 a city about one hundred miles from Shanghai.75 In 
addition, officials fined five fake Disney hotels built near where 
the Shanghai Disneyland Resort was to be built. 76  The SAIC 
reported that during the campaign period it handled a total of one 
hundred and twelve Disney trademark infringement cases.77 The 
Disney seizures and raids that were featured in various news 
outlets were subsequently seen by the media as promising signs 
that Disney will be successful in enforcing its rights.78 The rapid 
results may seem impressive at first glance. However, by using the 
ineffective campaign approach, Disney would not achieve its goal 
of combating infringement against its trademarks, or even  
reducing it. 
II. THE CAMPAIGN TRAP: IT IS INEFFECTIVE, BUT IS THERE A  
WAY OUT? 
Despite its repeated use, the campaign approach has not 
worked. Part II focuses on how the campaign strategy has rarely 
worked to successfully combat infringement in its current form for 
multinational companies or for intellectual property rights in 
general. Section II.A discusses incentives to using the campaign 
approach while Section II.B examines its overall ineffectiveness, 
details the problems with multinational corporations’ present use 
                                                                                                             
74 See id.; see also Wang Hongyi, Counterfeit Disney Products Target of Trademark 
Campaign, CHINA DAILY (Jan. 13, 2016), http://www.chinadaily.com.cn/kindle/2016-
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75 Distance from Shanghai to Hangzhou, DISTANCEFROMTO, https://www.distance
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78 See David Barboza & Brooks Barnes, How China Won the Keys to Disney’s Magic 
Kingdom, N.Y. TIMES (June 14, 2016), https://www.nytimes.com/2016/06/15/business
/international/china-disney.html [https://perma.cc/262W-WTS5]. 
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of civil litigation, and explores the obstacles to using  
criminal prosecution. 
A. The Short-Term Advantages of Campaigns 
Campaigns are used because multinational corporations and 
other rights holders prefer the cheapest and fastest method to solve 
their  counterfeiting  issues.79  Campaigns  have  some  short-term 
tangible effects. During the campaign period, factories and stores 
are closed down, large amounts of counterfeit goods are 
confiscated,  and  counterfeiters  are  arrested.80  People  selling 
counterfeits on the streets are removed quickly.81 The volume of 
enforcement  is  also  high  during  campaign  periods.82  Agency 
officials and law enforcement officers work overtime investigating 
rights holders’ claims. 83  Raids performed during the campaign 
period are also inexpensive and fast, and the rights holder receives 
results quickly.84 The temptation to obtain this type of enforcement 
is understandable for these reasons, and may explain why it is 
often used. 
Results from campaign-related raids make headlines in national 
and international papers. For example, in February 2017, a raid 
resulted in seized counterfeit Chanel, Christian Dior, and other 
brand-name cosmetics worth 120 million USD.85 In May 2017, the 
                                                                                                             
79 DIMITROV, supra note 29, at 189. 
80 See supra Section I.B; infra Section II.B. 
81 See supra Section I.B; infra Section II.B. 
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83 PETER K. YU, The Curious Case of Fake Beijing Olympics Merchandise, in 
TRADEMARK PROTECTION AND TERRITORIALITY CHALLENGES IN A GLOBAL ECONOMY 263 
(Irene Calboli et al. eds., 2014). 
84 See U.S. INT’L TRADE COMM’N, CHINA: INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY INFRINGEMENT, 
INDIGENOUS INNOVATION POLICIES, AND FRAMEWORKS FOR MEASURING THE EFFECTS ON 
THE U.S. ECONOMY 1–8 (2010), https://www.usitc.gov/publications/332/pub4199.pdf 
[https://perma.cc/6GXZ-HS49]; Harley I. Lewin, Understanding the Challenges and 
Nuances of Defending Intellectual Property Rights in China, in INSIDE THE MINDS: 
DEFENDING INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY RIGHTS CASES IN CHINA (Astapore 2013); see also 
supra Section I.D. 
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to reports of related counterfeit goods sold online. See Adam Jourdan, Chinese Police 
Seize $120 Million of Fake Cosmetics, REUTERS (Feb. 15, 2017), 
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media reported the largest raid seizure of brand-name counterfeit 
sports shoes, with around five hundred thousand pairs taken.86 The 
Disney Campaign in China, especially the raids and seizures 
resulting from it, similarly achieved headlines in multiple news 
outlets.87 The Chinese government also publicizes its campaigns 
through their websites and often point out items seized from 
raids.88 The China Chamber of International Commerce recently 
mentioned the Disney Campaign in a comment to the Office of the 
U.S. Trade Representative as an example of China substantially 
improving its intellectual rights protection. 89  Campaign results 
generate publicity and may create a sense that serious, effective 
action is being taken against counterfeiting, making campaigns 
attractive to multinational corporations. 
B. The Long-Term Ineffectiveness of Campaigns 
1. The Transient Effects of Campaigns 
Experts often criticize campaigns as “incur[ring] high 
administrative  cost[s]  with  transient  effects.”90  Multinational 
corporations criticize the SAIC’s actions because shortly after a 
raid, even as soon as the next day, infringers return to selling 
counterfeit  goods. 91   After  numerous  raids,  counterfeiting  
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operations move on to another town or factory, and continue to 
operate until they are subject to yet another campaign once 
companies  request  enforcement  measures  again.92  One  notable 
example of the transient effects of campaigns is the 2008 Olympic 
campaign. Leading up to the 2008 Beijing Olympics, the Chinese 
government made several decrees establishing a campaign to 
protect the Olympic symbols and other trademarks related to the 
games.93 Tens of thousands of government personnel across China 
worked  overtime  to  crack  down  on  counterfeits.94 However, 
counterfeit 2008 Olympics goods were still easy to find, during the 
campaign and afterwards.95 Vendors selling counterfeit Olympics 
goods continued to plague tourists. 96  Pirated versions of the 
opening ceremony popped up frequently in markets, even as close 
as two weeks after the ceremony itself.97 Despite the campaign and 
the high volume of enforcement actions, the sale of counterfeit 
merchandise was still widespread across China.98 
Another high-profile example of an ineffective campaign was 
the 2011 month-long campaign to eradicate imitation Apple Inc. 
(“Apple”) stores and unauthorized sellers of Apple products.99 The 
campaign began when an imitation Apple store found in Kunming, 
China made headlines around the world.100 Upon further search of 
the city, over twenty other imitation Apple stores were found.101 
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99 These are physical retail stores imitating Apple Inc. stores. This campaign differs 
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2018] PROTECTING THE MICKEY MOUSE EARS 439 
 
Several of these stores were shut down in Kunming.102 Imitation 
stores in Beijing’s technology district Zhongguancun were ordered 
to stop using the Apple logo, but many stores remained open after 
the campaign.103  Beijing store managers were slow to respond, 
with one stating: “If you come back a few days later, everything 
will be back as it was.”104 Imitation Apple stores even thrived in 
anticipation of a new phone’s launch.105 The number of imitation 
Apple stores has decreased over the years, but its decline could be 
credited to factors such as Apple’s increased physical presence in 
China, and a growing preference for locally-made technology, 
instead of the anti-counterfeiting campaign.106 
As a final example, Disney counterfeit goods are also alive and 
well, even inside the Shanghai Disneyland Resort itself.107 During 
2016 and 2017, visitors reported seeing counterfeit Minnie Mouse 
ears and Mickey Mouse hats sold in plain sight.108 One visitor 
                                                                                                             
102 See China Officials Close Fake Apple Stores in Kunming City, BBC (July 25, 2011), 
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TRIPADVISOR (June 14, 2017), https://www.tripadvisor.com/ShowUserReviews-g308272-
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stated: “People are selling counterfeit merchandise from back 
packs all over the park.”109 Another described numerous people 
“selling fake [D]isney items, raincoat[s,] and even cigarettes.”110 
On July 15, 2017, one traveler wrote there were people “walking 
up and down INSIDE the queues selling fake Disney merchandise 
(e.g., light-up toys, keychains, etc.).”111 The traveler went on to 
state that “[t]he first time it happened to us, I stared at the person in 
shock and she interpreted it as my interest to purchase something 
from her.”112  On September 1, 2017, another traveler similarly 
wrote: “[T]here [is] a black market, people [are] selling the same 
as the shops in the [D]isney street cheaper.”113 Six days later a 
visitor stated there were “[h]awkers selling (counterfeit?) swag all 
over the place, especially in the lines.”114 A disappointed visitor 
singled out Shanghai Disneyland Resort: “[O]nly here we can find 
people selling unauthorized merchandise [at] a lower price than [in 
the]  official  store.”115  More  examples  of  Disney  counterfeits  
are abundant.116 
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Shanghai_Disneyland-Shanghai.html#REVIEWS [https://perma.cc/E2LV-UWFZ]. 
115 Review by dolin wj, Very Crowded During Local Holiday. Maximize Fast Pass, 
TRIPADVISOR (July 4, 2017), https://www.tripadvisor.com/ShowUserReviews-g308272-
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For a campaign that specifically set out to eliminate Disney 
counterfeits, these results are dismal. Despite the campaign’s 
promises to protect the Shanghai Disneyland Resort area with 
emergency teams and strengthened patrols, counterfeits remain 
prevalent  in  the  park.117  Just  as  in  other  campaigns,  there 
were short term improvements, but no lasting change.118 
2. The Overuse of Campaign-Style Enforcement 
Despite its transient effects, the campaign approach is the tool 
of choice for solving infringement problems in China. At first, 
campaigns against infringement generally coincided with visiting 
foreign intellectual property or trade delegations, but since then 
campaigns have become a common government action.119 For the 
past several years, the annual agency “Action Plan” or 
“Implementation Plan” specifically coordinated the use of 
intellectual  property-related  campaigns.120  For  example,  one  of 
these intellectual property campaigns, “Special Campaign to 
Combat IPR Infringement and the Manufacture and Sales of 
Counterfeit and Shoddy Commodities,” lasted nine months.121 The 
Chinese government declared it a “huge success,” drawing 
attention to the high number of cases handled during campaign, 
even though counterfeit goods production is rising with China as 
the top culprit.122 In 2013, the government announced a six-month 
                                                                                                             
d10383031-r498461153-Shanghai_Disneyland-Shanghai.html#REVIEWS 
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Visitors, TRIPADVISOR (June 20, 2017), https://www.tripadvisor.com/ShowUserReviews-
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[https://perma.cc/Z4TV-SBWK]. 
117 See Jie, supra note 62; Special Campaign on Protection of Disney Trademarks, 
supra note 40. 
118 See discussion supra Section II.B.1. 
119 CHEN, supra note 33, at 803; see also Danielle Mihalkanin & Brad Williams, 
China’s Special Campaign to Combat IPR Infringement, CHINA BUS. REV. (Oct. 1, 2011), 
https://www.chinabusinessreview.com/chinas-special-campaign-to-combat-ipr-
infringement/ [https://perma.cc/BF6Z-3LBC]. 
120 CHEN, supra note 33, at 803–04. 
121 See Mihalkanin & Williams, supra note 119. 
122 Id.; see also supra notes 6–9 and accompanying text. 
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campaign  to  combat  counterfeit  pharmaceutical  products.123  In 
2014, the government created another campaign promising to fight 
intellectual property infringement online and elsewhere, such as  
websites  advertising  counterfeit  products.124   Another  2015  
government campaign, “Red Shield Net Sword,” similarly focused 
on purging counterfeits in online sales and lasted five months.125 
Every year the government carries out campaigns, yet counterfeit 
production is still rising in China.126 
Multinational corporations reinforce the use of government 
campaigns (especially the raids that come with them) by relying on 
them to enforce their rights.127 For example, similarly to Disney, 
other multinational corporations will establish close relationships 
                                                                                                             
123 See Michael Martina & Megha Rajagopalan, China Launches Crackdown on 
Pharmaceutical Sector, REUTERS (July 17, 2013), http://www.reuters.com/article/us-
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(Apr. 14, 2014), http://www.chinadaily.com.cn/china/2014-04/14/content_17432977.htm 
[https://perma.cc/U6DV-E8EU]. 
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CHINA, June 1, 2015, http://www.saic.gov.cn/zw/zcfg/gzjwj/201506/t20150603_
216912.html [https://perma.cc/79KG-DGNC]; see also Deanna Wong, China’s SAIC 
Sharpens Its Blades for Its 2015 ‘Red Shield Net Sword’ Enforcement Campaign, 
LIMEGREEN IP NEWS (Sept. 9, 2015), http://www.limegreenipnews.com/2015/09/chinas-
saic-sharpens-its-blades-for-its-2015-red-shield-net-sword-enforcement-campaign/ 
[https://perma.cc/5WFM-3VLW]; Gillian Wong, Chinese Regulator Announces New 
Crackdown on Online Sales of Fakes, WALL STREET J. (June 4, 2015), 
https://www.wsj.com/articles/chinese-regulator-announces-new-crackdown-on-online-
sales-of-fakes-1433414502. 
126 For example, the State Council in 2017 announced it would create new intellectual 
property campaigns, along with several campaigns for other issues such as product 
quality. See Guowuyuan Bangongting Guanyu Yinfa 2017 Nian Quanguo Daji Qinfan 
Zhishi Chanquan he Zhishou Jiamao Weilie Shangpin Gongzuo Yaodian de Tongzhi (国
务院办公厅关于印发 2017 年全国打击 侵犯知识产权和制售假冒伪劣商品工作要点
的通知), Notice of the General Office of the State Council on Issuing the Key Points in 
the Work of 2017 National Crackdown on IPR Infringement and the Manufacturing and 
Sale of Fake and Shoddy Goods, ST. COUNCIL (May 16, 2017), 
http://www.gov.cn/zhengce/content/2017-05/31/content_5198504.htm 
[https://perma.cc/W6B6-M6ER]. 
127 See FN Staff, supra note 91. 
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with enforcement agencies, such as the SAIC, to induce 
enforcement  measures.128  After  the  SAIC  conducts  a  raid,  the 
foreign company may treat the SAIC officials and investigators to 
dinner and karaoke, and give them public recognition for their 
role.129 If corporations cannot obtain SAIC’s help, they can hire 
independent local “providers,” or private investigators, to conduct  
raids  as  a  quick  way  to  get  goods  off  the  market.130 Providers 
can be one-man operations or large companies that cater to 
multinational  corporations  in  need  of  enforcement. 131 
Multinational corporations fall into the temptation of using the 
campaign approach to solve their intellectual property problems, 
which feeds into the government’s continued use of campaigns.132 
Companies occasionally initiate their own anti-counterfeiting 
actions, but these ultimately resemble the Chinese campaign, as 
they are short term attempts to combat infringement. For example, 
in 2006, Disney gave customers the opportunity to enter contests 
for free Disney prizes if they mailed in the hologram stickers on 
official Disney merchandise.133 Microsoft initiated its own anti-
counterfeiting actions as well.134 One action in 2008 consisted of 
causing a black screen to display every hour for users of pirated 
versions of Windows XP.135 Microsoft then began a “Keep it Real” 
anti-counterfeiting effort in 2012 after purchasing 169 computers 
                                                                                                             
128 PEGGY E. CHAUDHRY & ALAN ZIMMERMAN, PROTECTING YOUR INTELLECTUAL 
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CONSUMERS AND PIRATES 154 (1st ed. 2013). 
129 Id. 
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134 See Reuters, Software Pirates in China Beat Microsoft to the Punch, N.Y. TIMES 
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from shops in China, and finding that all were installed with 
pirated versions of Windows.136 As part of this effort, it notified 
sixteen Beijing sellers, who repeatedly sold these computers with 
pirated software, to stop.137 In 2015, still facing massive pirating, 
Microsoft took a different course by simply offering free upgrades 
to Windows 10 to all Windows users, whether or not they were 
running genuine copies of the software.138 Just as with government 
campaigns, these efforts by multinational corporations are short-
term and bring little long-term effects. Both the government and 
foreign companies have become heavily reliant on short-term 
actions, whether in the form of campaigns or general  
anti-counterfeiting efforts. 
3. Conflicts of Interest and Corruption Within Campaigns 
Campaigns are also rendered ineffective due to conflicts of 
interest and corruption. A major conflict of interest is the local 
government’s incentive to keep the local economy thriving, as 
local government authorities from different districts compete with 
each other for investment and growth, versus true enforcement of 
rights.139 Although top government authorities, such as the SAIC 
and the State Council, may coordinate campaigns, local 
government officials may not always carry them out correctly.140 
Incentivized to protect local economic activity, local officials 
impose light fines and lax enforcement on local counterfeiters, 
even in the face of orders from high officials.141 For example, a 
factory producing counterfeits at times can be the “largest single 
employer in the province,” so a government official will call the 
                                                                                                             
136 See Michael Kan, Microsoft Launches Anti-Piracy Campaign in China, 
COMPUTERWORLD H.K. (Dec. 16, 2012, 6:48 AM), http://cw.com.hk/news/microsoft-
launches-anti-piracy-campaign-china [https://perma.cc/QGZ6-5J97]. 
137 See id. 
138 See Paul Carsten & Bill Rigby, Microsoft Tackles China Piracy with Free Upgrade 
to Windows [Ten], REUTERS (Mar. 17, 2015), http://www.reuters.com/article/us-
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139 YI-CHIEH JESSICA LIN, FAKE STUFF: CHINA AND THE RISE OF COUNTERFEIT GOODS 48 
(1st ed. 2011). 
140 Id. at 48–51. 
141 Id. at 48. 
2018] PROTECTING THE MICKEY MOUSE EARS 445 
 
police and stop the ordered agency raid from occurring.142 A local 
agency may also accept bribes from both rights holders and 
counterfeiters, and will conduct—or fail to conduct—enforcement 
actions depending on which bribe is higher or depending on 
whether the counterfeiters contribute significantly to the local 
economy.143  Enforcement  becomes  selective,  with  agencies 
focusing on “easy” cases, such as counterfeits being sold in a store, 
rather than finding and closing down whole enterprises that 
produce the counterfeits.144 Raids, although the traditional method 
used by foreign companies as part of campaigns, merely become 
“propaganda show[s],” or illusions that action is being taken, 
instead  of  genuine  enforcement.145  Despite  numerous  raids, 
counterfeit items are still common in China partly due to 
conflicting interests within the Chinese government itself.146 
Independent local providers hired by corporations to conduct 
enforcement actions can also be corrupt, even working with 
counterfeiters to manufacture counterfeit goods and then “seize” 
them, and also create other obstacles to enforcing rights.147  As 
these providers are paid on commission, counterfeit seizures mean 
higher fees, creating an incentive to work with counterfeiters or 
manufacture their own counterfeit goods.148 For example, in 2015, 
the Associated Press released an investigative report that found 
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“anti-counterfeiting investigators were widely involved in copying 
products of their own western customers.”149 In another example, a 
company hired an investigator to track down counterfeit anti-
dandruff  shampoo  in  China.150  Instead  of  conducting  the 
investigation, he instead set up a factory to produce the shampoo 
himself which he then seized, calling it a successful raid.151 As a 
final example, Gucci brought an intellectual property case to court 
against a Chinese infringer relying on its investigator’s documents 
stating that two thousand counterfeit Gucci eyeglasses were found 
during a raid.152 The court dismissed Gucci’s case, finding that the 
documents  may  have  been  forged.153  Alexander  Theil,  an 
investigator who supervised thousands of raids for counterfeit 
goods mostly in China, stated that in many raids, “numbers are 
faked,  documents  are  faked  or  there  is  something  fishy.”154  
Conflicts of interests and corruption are rampant in raids, but the 
government and multinational corporations continue to rely 
heavily on them, whether as part of campaigns or as part of general 
anti-counterfeiting measures. 
4. The Responsive Nature of Campaigns 
As campaigns in China are responsive by nature, they are not 
dedicated to solving the root cause of intellectual property 
infringement. They are measures designed as a “rapid resolution of 
a major problem,” done in response to pressure by a company or 
government authority as well as in crisis situations.155  Pressure 
from government authorities to look good in the face of massive 
infringement, or a company’s board of directors looking for a fast 
solution to the situation in China, can also drive these short-term 
solutions.156 For example, when China began its quest to join the 
World Trade Organization, it turned to campaigns to crack down 
on counterfeits, leading to these campaigns’ characterization as 
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“political and diplomatic” measures to respond to foreign pressure 
rather  than  true  enforcement  of  intellectual  property  rights.157 
Customs enforcement of intellectual property rights also fluctuated 
depending on the level of U.S. government pressure.158 Provinces 
that are more dependent on foreign investment have significant 
amounts of enforcement actions against counterfeiters, while 
provinces that do not have foreign investment have little to 
none.159  Overall, campaigns come about if there is pressure or 
financial incentive, whether it is to combat criticism or drive 
investment, and not out of the true need for intellectual property 
enforcement itself.160 
5. Foreign Companies’ Rare Use of Civil Litigation 
Campaigns are used very often, which creates the impression 
that there must be no other possible method of effective intellectual 
property  rights  enforcement.161  This  is  not  the  case,  but 
corporations are neglecting alternative avenues. Disney has 
brought few intellectual property infringement cases in China since 
1994—only three—when compared to its vast number of cases 
handled in the United States.162 Disney’s over 3,500 intellectual 
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property matters in the United States alone consist of more than 
1,457 copyright, 1,760 patent, and 362 trademark cases, motions 
and filings.163 The lack of Chinese civil litigation cases, although 
having a high win rate, mirrors the trend for multinational 
corporations in general in China.164 
Even more troubling, the number of foreign intellectual 
property cases is actually shrinking. In 2013, foreign cases 
comprised 1.9% of all intellectual property cases in China.165 In 
2014, the number of foreign intellectual property cases dropped to 
1.8%.166 This number shrank further in 2015 to a mere 1.2%.167 In 
contrast, the number of total intellectual property cases in China is 
generally rising. Chinese courts received 133,863 cases in 2014, 
130,200 cases in 2015, and a record number of 152,072 in 2016.168 
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Based on the data, it seems local Chinese companies have much 
less hesitancy to use the civil litigation system than their  
foreign counterparts. 
Foreign companies make up a miniscule percentage of the civil 
litigation docket, but it is unclear why, as there are no explanations 
from the companies themselves. Instead of using the courts, 
Disney chose the campaign approach.169 Companies may see civil 
litigation, despite its advantages and improvements discussed in 
Part III, as costly and time-consuming to bring for intellectual 
property infringement when counterfeits are abundant. However, 
civil trademark and copyright cases generally take an average of 
four months to complete and have enduring consequences, unlike 
the campaign approach.170 The hesitancy could also be a matter of 
unfamiliarity with the Chinese court system. Whatever the reason, 
the civil litigation system is severely neglected by  
foreign companies. 
6. Obstacles to Using Criminal Prosecution Effectively 
Criminal prosecution is another way to enforce intellectual 
property rights in China, but one fraught with difficulties. 
Intellectual property infringement is expressly prohibited under the 
Criminal Law of the People’s Republic of China (“Chinese 
Criminal  Law”).171  Companies  can  bring  cases  directly  to  the 
Public Security Bureau (“PSB”) or administrative bodies such as 
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450       FORDHAM INTELL. PROP. MEDIA & ENT. L.J. [Vol. XXVIII:421 
 
the SAIC will transfer the cases to the PSB.172 In either option, if 
there is sufficient evidence, the PSB will then hand the case over to 
a people’s prosecutor for criminal prosecution.173 However, several 
challenges make criminal prosecution difficult. 
Criminal prosecution for these cases comes with high 
thresholds. A trademark infringer is punished if the case is of a 
“serious” nature, and in the case of an “especially serious” nature, 
the  time  of  imprisonment  lengthens.174  Knowingly  selling 
trademark-infringing merchandise with a “relatively large” sales 
volume can be punished with imprisonment, criminal detention, 
and fines.175  Forging or manufacturing of a “serious” nature is 
punished the same way.176 If the amount of the illicit income for 
forging or manufacturing is “especially serious,” then the time for 
imprisonment  is  extended.177  The  Supreme  People’s  Court 
interpreted the above trademark thresholds to mean that trademark 
infringement is punishable if the illegal business volume is 50,000 
RMB (7,496 USD) or above, or if the amount of illegal profits is at 
least 30,000 RMB (4,552 USD).178 Thresholds are applied to other 
types of intellectual property infringement; copyright infringers are 
punished if “the amount of illegal gains is relatively large” or if 
there are “other serious circumstances,” and patent infringers are 
similarly punished when the “circumstances are serious.”179 
Each type of illegal activity is only illegal if the circumstances 
are “serious,” which may overlook one-man infringers and 
infringers with small to medium scale operations, entirely in favor 
of only catching the big fish. The thresholds focus on the volume 
of the enforcement instead of the intellectual property right itself, 
implying the notion that people can infringe intellectual property 
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rights  in  certain  cases.180  The  United  States  brought  these 
thresholds under scrutiny when it made a request for consultations 
to the World Trade Organization, claiming that the thresholds do 
not follow article 61 of the Agreement on Trade-Related Aspects 
of Intellectual Property Rights, which the two countries promised 
to follow.181 Article 61 states: “Members shall provide for criminal 
procedures and penalties to be applied at least in cases of willful 
trademark counterfeiting or copyright piracy on a commercial 
scale.”182  Member  countries  found  that  China’s  “quantitative 
thresholds would not capture counterfeiting activities of limited 
value or smaller quantities,” and that these small scale illegal 
activities are “clearly meaningful,” as they contribute to the chain 
of  infringement.183  The panel  formed  to  investigate  the  claim 
further noted the lack of criminal procedures and penalties for 
crimes falling below the thresholds.184 Eventually, the panel found 
that China’s criminal measures do exclude some copyright and 
trademark infringement because of the thresholds, but also found 
that article 61 does not require member states to criminalize all 
copyright and trademark infringement.185 
As a result, Chinese criminal law remains unchanged to the 
detriment of rights holders. Only a select group of rights holders 
are protected. Evidencing this selectivity, a 2015 study of 376 
Chinese intellectual property criminal cases, the United States’ 
official statistics on about half of these cases, official U.S. and 
Chinese statistics on IP criminal and administrative enforcement in 
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both countries, and in-depth interviews with intellectual property 
law practitioners in China, revealed that those who successfully 
brought criminal infringement cases were in a “handful of 
economically or politically powerful companies in a few particular 
industries.”186  The  study  found  that  state-owned  enterprises  
comprised 49% of these companies and 44% were companies with 
controlling foreign shareholders or foreign intellectual property 
rights, such as multinational corporations or corporations that hold 
foreign brands.187 A mere 6.7% of Chinese criminal infringement 
cases  involved  domestic  private  and  collective  companies.188 
The majority of criminal infringement cases are also concentrated 
in a few companies with well-known brands, with at least 89.7% of 
all criminal infringement cases, whether foreign or domestic, 
falling into this category.189 
As it stands, only cases involving the biggest brands, or that 
seriously undermine the socialist market economy, are prosecuted, 
whether  foreign  or  domestic.190  The  opposite  is  the  case  for 
administrative petitions, such as those to the SAIC requesting 
raids, whose petitioners belong to a variety of industries and 
brands.191  Overall,  the  Chinese  criminal  system  handles  a  very 
small amount of infringement cases, with the vast majority of them 
being handled by administrative agencies.192 The deficiencies in 
the current Chinese criminal law lead to less cases prosecuted, less 
companies protected, and less opportunities for intellectual 
property  holders  to  enforce  their  rights.193  They  also  lead  to 
companies turning to campaigns, as the thresholds limit criminal 
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prosecution.194  This  is  worrisome  as  campaigns  generally  have 
only temporary effects. 
However, when it comes to engaging the criminal justice 
system, these companies fall into a trap just as they do when it 
comes to campaigns. Their routine strategy is to build rapport with 
officials and pay fees for officials to investigate their claims, 
thereby securing the prioritization of their cases from local 
criminal  law  enforcement.195  This  strategy  is  noted,  just  as  
for campaigns in general, as leading to piecemeal and ineffective 
enforcement.196 The current pattern leads to criminal prosecution 
only when the biggest foreign companies plead enough to instigate 
action  from  officials.197  This  creates  yet  another  unnecessary 
responsive enforcement regime.198 
In conclusion, the campaign approach as currently practiced is 
inherently weak and ineffective, and multinational corporations are 
reinforcing its use by nearly exclusively using campaigns. Upon 
announcement of the Disney Campaign, Jack Clode, the co-
founder of Blackspeak Group, a firm working on trademark 
enforcement issues in China, correctly asked: “Authorities will 
keep Disney happy and will get a few wins against 
counterfeiters—but the question is, [w]hat sort of long-term effect 
will this have?”199 This question conveys the crux of the problem 
with the current campaign approach: A campaign is a short-term 
solution for a long-term problem. As the results of campaigns have 
shown, the answer to his question is very little. 
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195 See id. at 163–64. 
196 See id. at 164. 
197 See id. at 165. 
198 See id. 
199 Gough, supra note 63. 
454       FORDHAM INTELL. PROP. MEDIA & ENT. L.J. [Vol. XXVIII:421 
 
III. MOVING BEYOND: INVESTING IN CIVIL LITIGATION, MODIFYING 
THE CAMPAIGN APPROACH, AND CREATING PRODUCTIVE 
ALLIANCES 
In September 2017, the State Council’s Ministry of Commerce, 
the ministry in charge of domestic and foreign trade,200 announced 
yet another campaign to attack intellectual property rights 
infringement.201  The campaign has the hallmarks of the classic 
Chinese campaign: it is responsive to external pressure, as it was 
created to increase foreign investment, and will last for a short 
period of time, from September to December 2017.202 With these 
hallmarks, it is highly likely this will be another campaign with 
transient effects. Lance Noble, Policy Director for the European 
Union Chamber of Commerce in China, seemed to recognize this 
and commented: “As welcome as further public commitments to 
protecting [intellectual property rights] are, this cannot be achieved 
through a campaign-style approach.” 203  He stated that instead, 
there needs to be “sustained commitment” to enforcement.204 
This campaign was also critiqued at the section 301 
Investigation and Hearing that the U.S. Trade Representative 
conducted on October 10, 2017.205 This investigation examined 
                                                                                                             
200 See Mission, MINISTRY OF COMMERCE CHINA (Dec. 7, 2010) http://english.mofcom
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China’s actions and policies regarding technology transfer, 
intellectual property, and innovation. 206  Mark Cohen, a Senior 
Counsel at the U.S. Patent and Trademark Office who has over 
thirty years of experience handling intellectual property issues in 
China, served as a panel member at the hearing.207 He noted the 
campaign’s time period of only three months and asked: “Many 
scholars think that these short campaigns have limited duration and 
effect . . . . So I’d like to know why is this particular program any 
different from other ones before it? Why not extend it or make it 
permanent? Or perhaps should the focus be on judicial reform or 
other areas?”208 
This Part will provide some answers to Cohen’s questions on 
how to improve enforcement and how multinational corporations 
can participate. Multinational corporations need to do their part in 
changing the enforcement paradigm, and work towards a long-term 
solution instead of falling into the campaign trap.209 This can occur 
in several ways. Section III.A examines recently-created tools and 
developments in the civil litigation system, such as the new 
intellectual property courts, the long-term effects of recent rulings 
on Chinese intellectual property law, and recent successes with 
preliminary injunctions. Section III.A also urges companies to take 
advantage of these opportunities through new and increased use. 
Section III.B then proposes modifications to the existing Chinese 
campaign approach using examples from campaigns in the United 
States and multinational brand alliances. Instead of relying heavily 
on campaigns and their raids, multinational corporations should 
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incorporate elements of the mechanisms above into a 
comprehensive, long-term strategy. 
A. Opportunities in Civil Litigation 
1. Establishment of the New Intellectual Property Courts 
The Chinese government looks to the civil litigation system as 
a place to combat infringement. To develop more protection for 
intellectual property rights, in 2014 the government developed 
several intellectual property courts (“IP Courts”) in Beijing, 
Shanghai,  and  Guangzhou.210  These  courts  handle  intellectual 
property cases and over time they have become more specialized in 
the  subject  matter.211  Other  characteristics  of  the  intellectual 
property courts are important to note. Although China is a civil law 
country and its courts are not required to follow precedent, the 
highest IP Courts have issued “guiding” cases and model rulings to 
inform lower courts on key issues. 212  For example, they have 
issued guiding cases on evidence preservation and preliminary 
injunctions, allowing these methods to become possible options for 
intellectual property owners. 213  The Beijing IP Court has cited 
prior cases in its rulings, making for a more uniform rule of law 
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regarding intellectual property rights.214  The IP Courts are also 
now publishing their decisions on a database for the public, 
creating more consistency and transparency as older cases are 
easier to find for judges deciding new ones.215 
In 2017, the government established new specialized circuit 
intellectual property tribunals (“IP Tribunals”) in Nanjing, Suzhou, 
Chengdu, and Wuhan, which will spread opportunities for 
intellectual property rights enforcement to other areas of China for 
national and foreign companies.216 IP tribunals are “attached” to 
the existing people’s courts in those cities. 217  These tribunals 
resemble the IP Courts in the sense that they exercise jurisdiction 
over intellectual property cases, and have judges with extensive 
experience with intellectual property litigation.218  Unlike the IP 
Courts, they have cross-regional jurisdiction, meaning they can 
handle cases from a variety of cities in a region.219 Overall, the 
civil litigation system for intellectual property rights is greatly 
improving, and foreign companies should not hesitate to use them. 
2. High Win Rates for Foreign Companies 
Civil litigation is the key way companies can combat 
infringement for long-term change. Chinese law, such as the 
Chinese Trademark Law (“Trademark Law”), gives companies the 
right to sue infringers. 220  Disney was one of the first foreign 
companies to see the advantages of civil litigation when it brought 
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an intellectual property infringement case in 1994 in Beijing.221 
The Beijing court in Walt Disney Co. v. Beijing Press and Xinhua 
Bookstores ruled against three Chinese publishing and distribution 
companies for their production of children’s books based on 
Disney’s animated films and characters without the company’s 
approval.222 Disney received a 227,000 yuan judgment against the 
Chinese  companies.223  Disney’s  latest  intellectual  property 
infringement civil case in 2016 was another win for the 
company.224  The  Shanghai  IP  Tribunal  levied  a  194,440  USD 
judgment against two infringing companies who created 
characters, titles, and posters substantially similar to those from 
Disney and Pixar’s “Cars” and “Cars 2” films.225 
Foreign companies in general have a high win rate for 
intellectual property-related civil litigation and even “had a 100% 
win rate” against counterfeiters in the Beijing IP Court in 2015.226 
For all copyright infringement cases, whether foreign or domestic, 
across China there is still a high 85% win rate in court.227 The win 
rates for copyright cases in the Beijing and Shanghai courts are 
82% and 92%, respectively.228 Trademark cases across China boast 
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a 91% win rate.229 The Beijing and Shanghai courts have win rates 
of  88%  and  87%,  respectively,  for  trademark  cases.230  The 
consistently high win rate, as well as their successes over the years 
in Chinese courts, should show foreign companies that the Chinese 
civil litigation system is more reliable to stop infringers in the 
country than the campaign approach. 
3. Civil Litigation’s Long-term Effects on Chinese Law 
Civil litigation also has long-term effects on Chinese law. For 
example, as a result of several cases, the Trademark Law was 
revised  with  tougher  restrictions  on  infringement.231  In  2011, 
Danjaq LLC, the U.S. company that produces the James Bond 
films, brought one such case that changed this law.232 Danjaq LLC 
brought a civil case against a Chinese condom maker who used the 
Chinese characters for “James Bond, 007” and the name in English 
as the trademark logos for its products.233 The condom producer 
argued that its trademark was valid and its products were in an 
unrelated business.234 However, the Beijing High People’s Court 
ruled that the condom producer “violated the ‘principle of good 
faith’ required under China’s trademark law when a trademark is 
registered.” 235  It also ruled that trademarks cannot infringe on 
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existing rights. 236  Consequently, the government created a new 
regulation as part of the Trademark Law taking effect in 2017 to 
protect well-known characters, including those in books and 
movies.237 The regulation stated that those characters and titles of 
works protected by copyright law cannot be used as trademarks by 
any entity that does not hold the copyright, unless the copyright 
holder grants permission.238 
This new regulation, created from a civil intellectual property 
case and not from a campaign,239 is useful for companies such as 
Disney who rely largely on its characters for business. Setting 
precedent through civil litigation makes it easier for companies to 
protect their trademarks, and to prove infringement in future civil 
cases. If a foreign company uses the civil litigation system, not 
only will they likely have a successful result, but also will likely 
permanently change laws in favor of intellectual property  
rights holders. 
4. Higher Damages Awarded for Intellectual Property  
Civil Cases 
The amount of damages won against infringers has risen, with 
the Beijing IP Court in a case between plaintiff Beijing Watchdata 
Data Systems Co. Ltd. and defendant Hengbao Co. Ltd. issuing its 
highest award for its jurisdiction to date, approximately 7.5 million 
USD, in December 2016.240 This civil case is also notable because 
it was the first time an award included an order for compensation 
                                                                                                             
tabid/259/ArticleID/3361/default.aspx [https://perma.cc/C2MX-WTJN] (last visited Nov. 
25, 2017). 
236 See Trademark Law Set for Major Shakeup, supra note 231. 
237 See Zuigao Renmin Fayuan Guanyu Shenli Shangbiao Shouquan Quequan 
Xingzheng Anjian Ruogan Wenti de Guiding (最高人民法院关于审理商标授权确权行
政案件若干问题的规定), [Provisions of the Supreme People’s Court on Several Issues 
Concerning the Hearing of Administrative Cases Involving the Granting and Affirmation 
of Trademark Right] (promulgated by Sup. People’s Ct., Dec. 12, 2016, effective Mar. 1, 
2017), art. 22, SUP. PEOPLE’S CT. CHINA, http://www.court.gov.cn/zixun-xiangqing-
34732.html [https://perma.cc/C6FS-Y6JJ]. 
238 See id. 
239 See id. at pmbl. 
240 See Pauline Booth & Yi Zhang, Chinese IP Courts Are Increasing Damages 
Awards, LAW360 (Feb. 2, 2017), https://www.law360.com/articles/885074/chinese-ip-
courts-are-increasing-damages-awards. 
2018] PROTECTING THE MICKEY MOUSE EARS 461 
 
for  litigation  expenses,  including  attorney  fees.241  Foreign 
companies are slowly but surely winning higher damages in court 
as well. In November 2015, the Beijing IP Court awarded 470,000 
USD to the Italian company Moncler for trademark infringement it 
suffered  from  a  Chinese  company.242  In  August  2017,  New 
Balance won 1.5 million USD in damages in the Suzhou IP 
Tribunal against the Chinese company New Boom, which 
produced and sold shoes with New Balance’s trademarked logo.243 
This landmark decision has the highest damages award for a 
foreign company in a trademark infringement case in China to 
date.244  It  was  also  noted  as  a  victory  for  foreign  companies 
attempting to enforce their rights in the Chinese civil courts.245 
Intellectual property experts viewed New Balance’s pursuit of 
enforcement in civil courts as a proactive, successful strategy, one 
that other foreign companies should implement in China.246 These 
recent results for both domestic and foreign companies should 
encourage foreign companies to see civil litigation as a worthwhile 
investment to combat infringement. 
5. The Rise of Preliminary Injunctions 
Preliminary injunctions are an additional useful tool for foreign 
companies.247 Preliminary injunctions are court rulings ordering a 
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11e7-bf50-e1c239b45787. This case was handled by the Suzhou IP Tribunal, which is 
attached to the Suzhou Intermediate People’s Court. See Li et al., supra note 213. 
244 See Sui-lee Wee, New Balance Wins $1.5 Million in Landmark China Trademark 
Case, N.Y. TIMES (Aug. 22, 2017), https://www.nytimes.com/2017/08/22/business/china-
new-balance-trademark.html [https://perma.cc/569V-9Y92]. 
245 See id. 
246 See Yiling Pan, New Balance’s Trademark Win Sets Right Example for Foreign 
Brands in China, JING DAILY (Aug. 23, 2017), https://jingdaily.com/new-balance-
trademark-win/ [https://perma.cc/DW3J-VMAU]; New Balance Wins US $1.5 Million in 
Damages for Trademark Infringement, ASIA IP (Oct. 12, 2017), http://asiaiplaw.com/
article/35/2917/ [https://perma.cc/VV9D-344F]. 
247 They are also known as “Conduct Preservation” or “Interim Injunctions” in China. 
See Zhen Feng & Suyu Yuan, How to Obtain Interim Injunctions in China, INT’L 
462       FORDHAM INTELL. PROP. MEDIA & ENT. L.J. [Vol. XXVIII:421 
 
party to perform or not perform an act.248  They were formally 
introduced to the civil litigation system in amendments to the 
Chinese Civil Procedure Law of 2012. 249  China’s preliminary 
injunction requirements closely resemble those of the United 
States. The court considers: whether the applicant has the 
likelihood of winning the case on the merits; whether the 
applicant’s rights are valid; whether there may be irreparable harm 
to the applicant; whether the harm caused by the injunction to the 
respondent is greater than harm caused to the applicant if no action 
is taken; and whether the injunction would harm the public 
interest.250 Additionally, the applicant must post a sufficient bond, 
or a specified amount of money, to be paid if the applicant fully or 
substantially loses the case or if the issuance of the injunction is a 
mistake.251 The bond is then used to offset the defendant’s losses in 
these situations.252 
Their formal introduction was seen as a positive step for 
intellectual property rights holders, as they now had a new 
opportunity  for  enforcement.253  Companies  in  general  are 
requesting preliminary injunctions for intellectual property 
                                                                                                             
TRADEMARK ASS’N (Feb. 15, 2017), https://www.inta.org/INTABulletin/Pages/Interim_
Injunctions_in_China_7203.aspx [https://perma.cc/3UA8-QGAX]. 
248 See, e.g., Civil Procedure Law of the People’s Republic of China (promulgated by 
Standing Comm. Nat’l People’s Cong., Apr. 9, 1991; amended Aug. 31, 2012, effective 
Jan. 1, 2013), arts. 100–05, CLI.1.183386 (EN) (Lawinfochina). 
249 See id. 
250 For the original notice in Mandarin see, Zuigao Renmin Fayuan Guanyu Shencha 
Zhishi Chanquan yu Jingzheng Jiufen Xingwei Baoquan Anjian Shiyong Falu Ruogan 
Wenti de Jieshi (Zhengqiu Yijian Gao) ((最高人民法院关于审查知识产权与竞争纠纷
行为保全案件 适用法律若干问题的解释 (征求意见稿)), Zuigao Renmin Fayuan (最
高人民法院) (Feb. 26, 2015), http://www.court.gov.cn/hudong-xiangqing-13517.html 
[https://perma.cc/B77U-UTEN]. For the English translation, see, INTERPRETATION OF THE 
SUPREME PEOPLE’S COURT ON SEVERAL ISSUES CONCERNING LAWS APPLICABLE TO 
REVIEW OF THE CONDUCT PRESERVATION FOR INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY AND COMPETITION 
DISPUTE CASES (DRAFT FOR COMMENT) art. 7 (2015), IPKEY (Feb. 26, 2015), 
www.ipkey.org/en/ip-law-document/download/2519/3310/23  
[https://perma.cc/7WC9-JFGU]; Feng & Yuan, supra note 247. 
251 See SUP. PEOPLE’S CT., supra note 250, arts. 9, 17–18. 
252 See id. art. 18. 
253 KRISTIE THOMAS, ASSESSING INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY COMPLIANCE IN 
CONTEMPORARY CHINA: THE WORLD TRADE ORGANISATION TRIPS AGREEMENT 91  
(1st ed. 2017). 
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infringement purposes more often in the last few years. 254  For 
example, in 2015, the Guangzhou IP Court granted a preliminary 
injunction for copyright infringement in favor of Blizzard 
Entertainment, a California video game company, against Chengdu 
Seven Games Limited (“Seven Games”).255 Seven Games created 
“Everyone WarCraft,” which infringed Blizzard’s World of 
Warcraft game.256 The Guangzhou IP Court ordered Seven Games 
and the website used to host the games to cease reproduction, 
distribution,  and  online  dissemination.257  In  August  2016,  the 
Beijing IP Court granted an injunction for trademark infringement 
in favor of Dutch company Talpa, the owner of the intellectual 
property rights in “The Voice” singing competition franchise, 
against a Chinese company that began producing a series named 
“The Voice of China.” 258  A few months later, the Fujian IP 
Tribunal granted an injunction for U.S. clothing company Under 
Armour against Chinese company Uncle Martian, with the 
underlying trademark infringement case resulting in 300,000 USD 
in damages awarded to Under Armour.259 In 2017, the Beijing IP 
Court granted a permanent injunction for Iwncomm, a Chinese 
internet technology company, against a foreign company, Sony 
                                                                                                             
254 See Jiang Liwei, Preliminary Injunction: The New Favorable of IP Litigation, 
CHINA IP MAG. (Aug. 2014), http://www.chinaipmagazine.com/en/journal-show.
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255 See Mark Cohen, The World of Injunctions: Guangzhou Makes Its Mark, CHINA IPR 
(Mar. 16, 2015), https://chinaipr.com/2015/03/16/the-world-of-injunctions-guangzhou-
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258 See Eugene Low & Deanna Wong, China: Whose Voice Is It?, LIMEGREEN IP NEWS 
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[https://perma.cc/5Q2S-C959]. The Chinese company, Canxing, previously held the 
rights to use the franchise name, but after it lost those rights it began producing “The 
Voice of China.” See id. 
259 See Bill Donahue, Under Armour Wins TM Ruling in China Over ‘Uncle Martian,’ 
LAW360 (Aug. 3, 2017), https://www.law360.com/articles/950991. The Fujian division 
of the IP Tribunal was established in the 1990s. Robert Slate, Judicial Copyright 
Enforcement in China: Shaping World Opinion on TRIPS Compliance, 31 N.C.J. INT’L L. 
& COM. REG. 665, 680 (2006). 
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Corporation (“Sony”), for standard essential patent infringement 
when Sony used Iwncomm’s patent without authorization.260 The 
court also ordered Sony to pay 8.62 million RMB (1.25 million 
USD)  in  damages  to  Iwncomm.261  Expanding  the  use  of 
preliminary injunctions to patents, the Guangzhou IP Court granted 
the first preliminary injunction for patent infringement on June 22, 
2016 for Christian Louboutin Ltd. against Guangzhou Benefit 
Cosmetics Co., which had manufactured and sold  
infringing lipsticks.262 
The cases above are the few examples of foreign companies 
using preliminary injunctions, demonstrating they are certainly not 
the go-to response for combating infringement. This is the case 
despite high grant rates. In Beijing and Shanghai, courts granted 
injunctions against trademark infringement 97% of the time.263 
Across China, injunctions were granted in 96% of cases where 
there was a finding of trademark infringement.264 The injunction 
rate for copyright infringement is similar, with 90% and 88% 
granted in Beijing and Shanghai courts, respectively, and 89% 
granted across China. 265  The minimal use of injunctions must 
change. Preliminary injunctions are a powerful tool for 
multinational companies if these companies invest their time in 
securing them rather than pursuing ineffective campaigns. 
                                                                                                             
260 See An Injunction Based on a Standard Essential Patent Is Happening in China, 
BEIJING E. IP LTD. (Apr. 1, 2017), http://www.beijingeastip.com/type-news/injunction-
sep-china/ [https://perma.cc/2X8L-FCD9]; Iwncomm v. Sony: First SEP-Based 
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supra, note 230. 
264 CIELA TRADEMARK: ALL COURTS, supra note 170. These figures are as of 2015. 
265 CIELA COPYRIGHT: BEIJING, supra note 228; CIELA COPYRIGHT: SHANGHAI, supra 
note 228; CIELA COPYRIGHT: ALL COURTS, supra note 170. These figures are as of 2015. 
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6. China’s Commitment to Improving Its Civil Litigation 
System and What This Means for Foreign Companies 
Multinational companies need to change their strategies on 
civil litigation. Companies should pressure the government to 
focus not on quick enforcement, but on long-lasting deterrence that 
comes with civil litigation.266 The government itself has recently 
intensified its focus on the civil litigation system. On November 
27, 2016, the State Council released a statement entitled: “Opinion 
of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of China 
(C[P]C) and the State Council on improving the property rights 
protection (PRP) system and lawfully protecting property 
rights.”267 It was the first time the government set out guidelines 
regarding intellectual property rights for lower government bodies 
across China, such as the IP Courts.268 The Chinese government 
statement openly admitted that intellectual property protection in 
China is “weak.”269 
Among other improvements, section 9 of the guideline calls for 
raising damages and for the implementation of a new punitive 
damages system for serious violations.270 Along with the recent 
decisions in the Beijing Watchdata and New Balance cases, these 
moves counter prior criticisms that damages awarded were too low 
to make civil litigation worth the effort.271 In addition to these 
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changes, in 2017 the State Intellectual Property Office announced a 
two-year arbitration mediation pilot program for intellectual 
property disputes in key areas such as Beijing and the Shanghai 
municipality.272  As shown above, China has made great strides 
with its civil litigation system. As civil litigation—and alternative 
dispute resolution mechanisms—improve over time, these will 
most likely become the frontline in combating intellectual  
property infringement. 
However, with the multinational companies’ low use of civil 
litigation, there is wasted potential. It is clear that campaigns are 
not working.273 To improve intellectual property enforcement in 
China, companies should take the opportunity to enforce their 
rights more often in this channel. This does not mean that 
companies should bring any case to make a point, only that they 
ought to bring winning cases and bring them more often. 
Companies should also substantially increase requests for 
preliminary injunctions, as it is a new and effective avenue for 
remedying infringement.274 Disney led the way with its first civil 
judgment in 1994 and—along with other multinational 
corporations—should substantially increase its use of civil 
litigation and preliminary injunctions as part of its China strategy 
to bring more attention to its rights, shape the law, and shut down 
counterfeiting operations.275 
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B. Changing the Chinese Campaign Approach Itself 
Despite the problems with the campaigns described in this 
Note, campaigns need not be eradicated altogether. It would be 
more cost-efficient to modify campaigns, as China develops 
intellectual property campaigns every year. Fortunately, there are 
examples of more effective campaigns. The examples come from 
the United States, where campaigns are also carried out to combat 
counterfeit goods, but are implemented differently than Chinese 
campaigns. These examples will illustrate how campaigns can run 
more effectively. This Section features examples of multinational 
corporate alliances that combat counterfeiting, and recommends 
corporate alliances for those doing business in China. 
If done in an effective way, campaigns can have long-term 
results. They could also then be a more fruitful part of a 
multinational corporation’s strategy. Perhaps one day a 
multinational corporation may be able to balance both effective 
campaigns and civil litigation, obtaining the benefits of both 
systems, as part of a comprehensive scheme to battle infringement. 
1. A New Model for Campaigns: The U.S. “Operation” 
Counterfeit automotive parts have become a growing problem 
in the United States.276  The vast majority—between eighty-five 
and ninety-five percent—of these counterfeit parts are imported 
from mainland China or transferred to Hong Kong and then 
shipped  abroad.277  Counterfeit  parts  range  from  brakes  to 
airbags.278  The  parts  are  untested  and  sub-quality,  leading 
potentially to consumer deaths.279 For example, some counterfeit 
airbags were found to contain explosive elements that explode in 
                                                                                                             
276 See Intellectual Property Rights Center Warns of Counterfeit Auto Parts, U.S. 
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the victim’s face during an accident.280 Online sales have spurred 
the counterfeit operations, making it easier for counterfeiters to 
reach consumers abroad with their cheaper products.281 
Automotive-manufacturing companies reported these 
counterfeit airbags to the National Intellectual Property Rights 
Coordination Center (“IPRC”).282 The IPRC is the administrative 
body created to focus solely on intellectual property theft and 
enforcement.283  Led  by  a  director  from  the  Department  of 
Homeland Security, and deputy directors from the same, the 
Federal Bureau of Investigations, and U.S. Customs and Border 
Protection, the IPRC also works with enforcement groups 
including Interpol, the World Customs Organization, and 
representatives  from  foreign  countries.284  The  IPRC  is  further 
divided into three units: the Intellectual Property Unit, Outreach 
and Training Unit, and the HSI Commercial Fraud Unit.285 Of the 
three, the Intellectual Property Unit starts and maintains operations 
such as Operation Team Player, which targets the sale and 
trafficking of counterfeits sports merchandise and apparel in the 
United States.286 The Intellectual Property Unit also collaborates 
with industry partners, such as companies and partner agencies.287 
For example, in addition to the IPRC receiving reports from car 
companies, the U.S. Customs and Border Protection (“CBP”) 
discovered a counterfeit airbag shipment from China at a DHL 
facility en route to Tennessee.288 As counterfeit automotive parts 
are a health and safety concern, along with a growing intellectual 
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property issue, spin-off investigations were initiated to take action 
against this new problem.289 
In particular, the IPRC launched Operation Engine Newity 
(“Operation”)—a campaign with American characteristics—
focusing on countering “the threat of counterfeit automotive, 
aerospace, rail, and heavy industry related components that are 
illegally imported and distributed throughout the United States.”290 
Some of its strategies include: educating industry stakeholders and 
the public, investigating and prosecuting counterfeiters and 
traffickers, and barring and confiscating counterfeit goods at places 
such as ports of entry.291 As the IPRC works with members of 
different federal agencies, the Operation also relies on members of 
different agencies, and coordinates efforts with these agencies.292 
For example, it shares information with the U.S. Customs and 
Border Protection to discover and halt any incoming counterfeit 
goods. 293  Through its efforts, the Operation successfully stops 
counterfeits at the border, uncovers counterfeit goods, and 
criminally prosecutes both small and large operations.294 
One of the Operation’s features is its collaboration with the 
industry.295  With  the  assistance  of  the  IPRC,  multinational 
corporations created the Automobile Anti-Counterfeiting 
Coalition, which meets four times per year, and exchanges 
information on its members’ counterfeiting experiences with 
federal agencies, such as the IPRC. 296  This is similar to other 
corporate alliances, such as the U.S. Golf Manufacturers Anti-
Counterfeiting Working Group, which is a collaboration of U.S. 
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golf manufacturing companies working against the counterfeiting 
of golf products in China.297 As part of the Operation, corporations 
coordinate with law enforcement and other agencies—they 
exchange information with the IPRC and other federal agencies 
involved through regularly scheduled conference calls and other 
types of frequent communication.298 Companies have also created 
their own anti-counterfeiting operations through commercials and 
by notifying their consumers. For example, Hyundai and Honda 
created advertising campaigns through websites and commercials 
depicting the differences between counterfeit and authentic car 
parts, and illustrating the dramatic disparities between the two 
products should the consumer ever experience a car accident.299 
2. Key Differences Between U.S. Operations and  
Chinese Campaigns 
There are key differences between Chinese and U.S. 
campaigns. The first is the presence of a dedicated team focusing 
on counterfeits. The IPRC has both the Intellectual Property Unit, 
which is dedicated to its continuing IP operations,300 and members 
from different federal agencies and governments coordinating 
these efforts.301 In China, different agencies join a campaign, but 
they are not coordinated.302 This leads to a lack of information 
sharing, commitment only when a campaign is launched, and a 
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waste of resources when some infringers are raided repeatedly or a 
single case is reported multiple times.303 The lack of coordinated 
effort additionally leads to shirking of duties.304 Agencies have 
different priorities, complicated by their local branches who might 
take into account the economic well-being of their locality, and 
will let a counterfeiting operation continue for the revenue—
especially when the campaign is left uncoordinated.305 
The second difference is that the IPRC’s efforts do not stop 
until the problem is solved. Unlike the majority of Chinese 
campaigns, operations do not end after a few weeks or months.306 
Investigations, seizures, and raids continue for years, and the 
protection of intellectual property rights is an ongoing effort.307 
Also, its operations are not responsive in nature. While reports 
from automotive companies were coming in, the IPRC was already 
conducting an investigation into counterfeit goods when the 
counterfeit airbags were discovered by the CBP on their way to 
Tennessee.308  In  contrast,  Chinese  campaigns  only  start  after 
mounting government or company pressure, or if a crisis occurs, 
giving rise to inconsistent and temporary enforcement to appease 
groups.309  If  China  wants  to  improve  its  enforcement  against 
infringement, it will need to modify its campaigns to bring  
lasting change. 
3. Multinational Corporation Alliance Opportunities 
Where does this leave multinational corporations? So far, 
multinational corporations in China seem to be working mostly on 
their own. Occasionally, there are corporate alliances and 
information sharing. For example, Disney is a member of the 
Quality Brands Protection Committee (“QBPC”) with other 
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multinational corporations.310 The QBPC organizes meetings and 
seminars  with  corporations.311  The  QBPC’s  mission  is  “[t]o 
strengthen cooperation with China’s central and local government 
agencies, institutions, enterprises,” and other organizations to 
promote “the improvement of China’s IP legal system, the IP 
administrative [and] judicial enforcement, the guiding role of 
judicial protection, the construction of a fair and orderly legal 
environment for economic growth and scientific [and] 
technological innovation for global interconnection and 
intercommunication.”312 Yet this broad statement does not focus 
on a particular mission or issue—such as a type of counterfeit good 
or intellectual property—and instead groups multiple  
issues together. 
Additionally, the QBPC’s membership spans across different 
industries, from clothing stores, food, electronic goods, toys, 
cosmetics, films, to car manufacturers. 313  Its Industry Working 
Groups, which bring similar companies together, also make it 
difficult for a company that may not fit into only one group to 
work into this framework.314 For example, Disney could easily fit 
into the Creative, Diversified, Sports, Fashion and Life Style, and 
Toys and Licensed Goods working groups, but it would be difficult 
to invest time into every group to work with members who may 
not  share  or  understand  Disney’s  priorities.315  The  QBPC’s 
mission and groups are so broad that the alliance may not focus on 
the individual needs of companies, the intellectual property laws 
that apply to different industries, or different priorities. While the 
QBPC alliance membership is a positive step for a corporation to 
take, it may not ultimately be the most efficient or effective. 
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Multinational corporations such as Disney should not only take 
advantage of the civil litigation system more often, but also form 
smaller and more specific alliances related to intellectual property 
infringement in China, similar to the one Operation Engine Newity 
created.316 Disney and other foreign animation or film studios—
such as DreamWorks Animation SKG, Inc. (“Dreamworks”) and 
Warner Bros. Entertainment Inc. (“Warner Bros.”)—should come 
together and share information instead of working alone. These 
companies have similar goals and issues in China. All want to 
conduct business in China, with Warner Bros. signing a new deal 
this year to license hundreds of its films with the popular Chinese 
streaming company iQiyi, and DreamWorks creating a joint 
venture with a Chinese animation studio to develop more films.317 
All only take a twenty-five percent share of box office revenue due 
to China’s revenue cap and are subject to Beijing’s quota system, 
which allows thirty-four foreign films to be imported annually.318 
Any foreign films released in China are assigned limited theatrical 
release  dates,  limiting  any  profits  in  China  further.319 All 
experience infringement of their trademarked and copyrighted 
characters, logos, names, and films.320 
These companies have also successfully brought cases in 
China. For example, DreamWorks brought a civil case to oppose a 
person attempting to trademark “KUNG FU PANDA,” and this 
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case led to the creation of prior merchandising rights, a new tool 
that companies can use to protect their trademark rights.321 These 
companies can share information on infringement, lobby 
governments for better laws (such as lowering the threshold for 
criminal prosecution), and create a strategy with effective 
enforcement actions. They can also create their own long-running 
non-government campaigns, taking cues from the IPRC’s 
“operations,” that not only have dedicated staff, but also engage 
their audiences and encourage them to participate in the anti-
counterfeiting effort. Disney did this once before with the 2006 
hologram sticker campaign, which actually caused Chinese 
consumers to report counterfeit goods to Disney.322 Perhaps new, 
united, long-term efforts can spark even more of these results. If 
similarly-situated companies can come together and coordinate 
their actions, then there can be positive, enduring change in China. 
CONCLUSION 
It is difficult for a multinational corporation to protect its 
intellectual property rights in China. Often under pressure to bring 
immediate results to a dire situation, the corporation will fall into 
the campaign trap. Disney knows this all too well as it attempts to 
protect its rights in China. After experiencing counterfeiting, the 
company turned to the campaign approach for help. However, the 
government campaign intended to protect Disney’s rights, just as 
campaigns in the past, had only transient effects. This is because 
campaigns are short-term solutions for a long-term problem. 
Instead of focusing its efforts on bringing short-term campaigns, 
multinational corporations such as Disney should focus on long-
term solutions that will deter infringers and bring transformative 
effects. Companies should continue taking action, but outside of 
the context of a traditional Chinese campaign. A comprehensive 
strategy of civil litigation, criminal prosecution, and productive 
industry-specific alliances will help bring positive change. The 
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Chinese government should also continue to improve its civil 
litigation and criminal prosecution systems, and create coordinated 
campaigns with dedicated teams that are ongoing for long periods 
of time. With the efforts of both multinational corporations and the 
government, lasting protection of intellectual property rights can 
continue to grow in China. 
